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DEBATE 
CONGRESS’S POWER TO COMPEL THE TELEVISING OF 
SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS 
In this debate, Professor Bruce Peabody, of Fairleigh Dickinson 
University, and Scott Gant, a partner at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, 
discuss the constitutionality of proposed legislation that would televise 
the oral arguments and opinion readings of the Supreme Court.  Pro-
fessor Peabody believes that the constitutional basis for such legisla-
tion lies in the Necessary and Proper Clause because, as he argues, 
televising the Supreme Court not only “promot[es] judicial opera-
tions,” but also “furthers [] legitimate government . . . objective[s] . . . 
such as supporting Congress’s oversight role or keeping the public in-
formed about public affairs.”  Mr. Gant takes exception to the argu-
ment that the proposed bill is justified by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  He argues that “[n]o one even pretends that televising oral 
arguments would improve them, or the process of litigating a case be-
fore the Court,” and concludes that “[l]egislation compelling the 
Court to televise its oral arguments does not pass muster” under the 
standard established in McCulloch v. Maryland, which says that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause “authorizes only action ‘appropriate’ and 
‘plainly adapted’ to the pursuit of ‘legitimate’ ends.”  In his closing, 
Professor Peabody contends that Mr. Gant’s conceptualization of the 
McCulloch standard is too narrow and argues that “it strains credulity 
to believe that improving and expanding the existing means of com-
munication is unrelated to th[e] goal of civic education.”  Mr. Gant, 
unconvinced by Professor Peabody’s rejoinder, states, “When there is, 
at best, questionable authority for legislative action, I believe more ex-
acting scrutiny should be applied to that action if it impinges on the 
independence or authority of a coequal branch of government.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
A Recent Proposal Requiring the Supreme Court To Televise Its Public 
Proceedings Is Constitutional 
Bruce G. Peabody†
C-SPAN is closing in on its thirtieth anniversary of covering Con-
gress, and the war in Iraq, among other developments, ensures that 
the executive branch is a relentless television presence.  But political 
chatter is beginning to build about a potential new player in this tele-
vision lineup of Washington potentates.  Members of Congress, along 
with a number of legal and political commentators, are showing in-
creasing interest in a proposal to require the Supreme Court to tele-
vise some of its proceedings.  The measure, S. 344, introduced by 
Senator Arlen Specter, would air the Court’s “open sessions”—the 
oral arguments and opinion readings currently accessible only to the 
fortunate few who can view the Court’s work in person.  The legisla-
tion under consideration would allow a “majority of justices” to turn 
the cameras off if coverage threatened “the due process rights of 1 or 
more of the parties before the Court.” 
The Court is not exactly enthusiastic about this legislation or the 
attention it has generated.  Over the past year, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy has appeared twice before Congress to convey his opposition to 
televising the Court, and, implicitly, to the Specter bill.  During one of 
those presentations, Justice Clarence Thomas also expressed his reser-
vations, stating that the proposal “runs the risk of undermining the 
manner in which we consider cases.” 
To date, the legal objections raised by these and other Justices 
have been rather veiled, perhaps reflecting a sense that citing specific 
concerns would constitute an improper advisory opinion, a judgment 
outside of the context of an actual case or controversy.  But there is a 
possibility, perhaps even a likelihood, that if the Court continues to 
resist broadcasting its proceedings, Specter’s proposal, or one like it, 
will one day become law.  At that point, the Court may be afforded a 
more formal opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of such a 
measure, assuming its validity is challenged in a judicial forum. 
But if the Court confronts a law resembling the one currently be-
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ing considered, it should affirm the legislation.  The proposed televi-
sion bill is consistent with the Constitution’s text, traditions, and sys-
tem of separated powers—notwithstanding the vague objections of the 
Justices. 
Our analysis of this matter might begin by delineating the basis for 
the legislature’s authority to enact the television law.  While the Con-
stitution bestows Congress with substantial leeway in determining the 
“Rules of its [own] Proceedings,” there is no explicit textual analogue 
establishing its general authority to shape the organization and rules 
of the Supreme Court.  Article III does empower Congress to make 
“Exceptions” to and “Regulations” of the Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion, and this might be a plausible basis for some proposals to televise 
the high bench.  But historically, these Article III controls have not 
been the legal touchstone for regulating the Court’s internal proce-
dures and, in any event, the legislation currently being considered is 
not limited to televising appellate matters (even though these make 
up the overwhelming percentage of the Court’s docket). 
A more general and perhaps less controversial basis for requiring 
the Court to televise its public proceedings can be found in Congress’s 
broad authority to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution” the powers of the federal government.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause has been the presumptive constitu-
tional basis for an enormous amount of legislation regulating the af-
fairs of the judiciary and helping to carry “into Execution” the “judi-
cial Power of the United States,” which the Constitution vests in the 
Supreme Court.  For example, Title 28 of the U.S. Code includes nu-
merous provisions through which Congress mandates how the Court 
conducts its business—from how many Justices sit on the Court, to 
what constitutes a quorum, to how “precedence” shall be recognized 
among Associate Justices, to what happens to gifts given to the Court 
or its members. 
A skeptic might counter that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
only authorizes laws governing the internal affairs of the Court if the 
legislation clearly promotes the “judicial power” and, specifically, the 
work of the Court.  Under this reading, proposals to mandate “Su-
preme Court TV” should be deemed constitutionally suspect because 
members of the Court have contended that television coverage would 
impede their work by, for example, changing the dynamics of oral ar-
gument and jeopardizing the Justices’ relative anonymity and, conse-
quently, personal safety. 
Advancing the work of the judiciary, including the Supreme 
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Court, is undoubtedly one valid application of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  For example, Congress’s establishment of a system of 
law clerks and its creation of a Marshal of the Court assist the Justices 
by enhancing their ability to winnow through petitions, craft opinions, 
and work in a secure environment. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause is designed not simply to en-
hance the work of the judiciary, however, but to facilitate all the “Pow-
ers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.”  Thus, the proposed television legislation is constitutionally 
sound if it furthers some legitimate government power or objective 
wholly separate from promoting judicial operations, such as support-
ing Congress’s oversight role or keeping the citizenry informed about 
public affairs.  Arguably, legislation like the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) is constitutionally defensible under these terms.  If we 
don’t adopt this interpretation of the permissible applications of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress would seem to have almost no 
capacity to respond to a Court that sought to close its hearings en-
tirely, keep its transcripts secret, or release them after a year—
outcomes that surely run counter to our deepest commitments to 
governmental openness and accountability. 
Moreover, the Necessary and Proper Clause historically has been 
the constitutional basis for legislation that serves a kind of administra-
tive or “housekeeping” role, filling in the details of general policy ar-
eas, including those related to essential aspects of the Court’s opera-
tions, such as when the Court’s term begins.  Thus, pursuant to the 
Court’s opening of its building to the general public, Congress has 
passed laws regulating this access, stipulating where members of the 
public can travel (“sidewalks and other paved surfaces”) and how they 
may conduct themselves (they are forbidden from displaying signs, 
placards, or other forms of advertisement in the “[b]uilding or [on 
its] grounds”).  These uncontroversial regulations bear considerable 
resemblance to the current television legislation.  The Court already 
makes its proceedings available to the public through live observation, 
written transcripts, and audio recordings.  The television bill would 
provide further specification, clarification, and expansion of the 
means through which the Court is seen and heard. 
Even if one were to set aside these arguments and focus on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as a provision limited to promoting the 
work of the Supreme Court and enhancing the administration of jus-
tice, this restricted conception does not necessarily address the ques-
tion of who should determine what laws facilitate these ends.  The 
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Constitution identifies Congress, not the Court, as the nation’s chief 
federal policymaker, and presumably the legislature is generally best 
equipped to make cost-benefit and other analyses pertinent to assess-
ing whether various legislative initiatives would enhance or diminish 
the work of our different institutions of governance. 
But would the television proposal satisfy the test imposed by the 
most narrow application of the Necessary and Proper Clause—that is, 
would it actually facilitate the Court’s duties?  While it is plausible that 
this television coverage could enhance the legitimacy and effective-
ness, along with the profile, of the Court, the case is difficult to estab-
lish one way or the other.  There is a mixed and uncertain record re-
garding the effects of television coverage on the efficacy of other 
tribunals.  But this ambiguity actually underscores the argument that a 
court should not invalidate the proposed television legislation solely 
on the grounds that the bill purportedly fails to advance the work of 
the Court (and therefore strays beyond the Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
In addition to raising questions about its constitutional basis, op-
ponents of the television bill have also hinted that it impinges upon 
the separation of powers.  As Justice Kennedy warned, “We think that 
proposals mandating and directing television in our court are incon-
sistent with the deference and etiquette that should apply between the 
branches.” 
It’s hard to know exactly what to make of this objection, but one 
might distill a separation of powers argument of the following form:  
A bill requiring the Supreme Court to televise its proceedings, even 
those it already makes available to the public, would encroach upon 
the Court’s Article III “judicial Power.”  In addition to infringing upon 
the Court’s authority, the television proposal would inappropriately 
shift inherently judicial powers to the Congress. 
On one level, this objection seems tethered to a rather cramped 
and unrealistic view of the separation of powers.  As noted previously, 
Congress has long exercised enormous discretion over the function-
ing of the judiciary, making rules and policies that impact the Court’s 
work and even shape its very judgments (while the Court promulgates 
federal rules, for example, they are ultimately subject to Congress’s 
approval and amendment).  The Court can’t insist that every one of 
these regulations is a violation of the separation of powers; the Consti-
tution and our legal traditions implicitly recognize the legislature as 
our general federal rule-making body even for the other branches of 
government. 
51 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 46 
PENNumbra 
But presumably, there are some central elements of the Court’s 
authority that cannot be impeded upon by Congress without com-
promising what The Federalist No. 51 called “that separate and distinct 
exercise of the different powers of government.”  For example, a fed-
eral law stipulating that the Court could not publish dissenting opin-
ions would threaten its institutional responsibility to decide cases and 
controversies, and thereby amount to a violation of Article III. 
Does the proposed television bill look more like a permissible 
regulation or an encroachment upon the Court’s core Article III du-
ties?  As already indicated, the television bill seeks to provide greater 
access to one of the central institutions of American government and, 
in so doing, it furthers the legitimate interests of public awareness and 
judicial accountability.  Requiring the Court to televise proceedings it 
already makes available to some members of the public, so long as this 
coverage does not impede individual liberties, does not represent a 
substantive alteration of the Court’s institutional role, nor does it in-
herently jeopardize the Court’s ability to evaluate and judge specific 
cases.  Indeed, given our current capacity to install television cameras 
in an unobtrusive manner, the proposed law should not really change 
how the Court conducts its business at all.  The proceedings of the 
Court should look no different before and after the cameras are in-
stalled. 
Perhaps, however, television cameras will threaten the Court’s Ar-
ticle III powers more indirectly.  Several commentators, including Jus-
tice Breyer, have expressed concern that television coverage of the 
Court might damage its prestige and reputation, thereby impeding its 
effectiveness and ability to perform its constitutional responsibilities.  
As Justice Rehnquist once asserted, frequent appearances of the Jus-
tices on the “six o’clock news every night” would lessen “the mystique 
and moral authority” of the Court. 
But, setting aside the question of whether this concern is even 
plausible as an empirical matter, it’s not obvious that courts should in-
validate a bill on constitutional terms simply because it could have a 
negative effect on an institution’s “mystique and moral authority.”  
Arguably, for example, both FOIA and the (now lapsed) independent 
counsel statute have diminished the mystique and authority of the ex-
ecutive branch, but this fact alone does not make these measures con-
stitutionally suspect. 
In sum, there are compelling reasons for believing that mandating 
television coverage of the Supreme Court is compatible with the regu-
latory traditions as well as the underlying logic of the Necessary and 
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Proper Clause, and the Constitution as a whole.  Moreover, the pro-
posed law would not run afoul of our commitment to separated insti-
tutions and powers.  The time has come for the Supreme Court to join 
the other branches of federal government in accepting the greater ac-
countability, transparency, and democracy that accompanies televised 
proceedings.  If the Court won’t make this transition on its own, Con-
gress can employ its constitutional powers to guarantee the public a 
valid means for scrutinizing the most powerful court in the world. 
REBUTTAL 
Televising the Supreme Court 
Scott E. Gant†
I admit it.  I enjoy watching Supreme Court oral arguments.  The 
grilling of the lawyers.  The interplay among the Justices.  Hints of the 
decision to come.  It’s fascinating stuff. 
Unfortunately, despite working thirty minutes from the Court, I 
only make it to oral arguments every now and then.  If the Court’s ar-
guments were televised, I’d surely be one of the most loyal viewers.  
But I’m not sure that televising oral arguments would be good for the 
Court, or for the country.  More important, however, is that I’m fairly 
certain a law forcing the Court to televise oral arguments would be 
unconstitutional. 
Professor Peabody appropriately focuses his attention on the pos-
sible sources of constitutional authority to enact such a law.  Although 
we often seem to forget it, there are limits on Congress’s power.  The 
Court has observed many times what the Constitution itself makes 
clear:  Congress may act only if authorized by one of the powers dele-
gated to it by the Constitution.  In my judgment, none of the powers 
assigned to Congress allow it to force the Court to televise its proceed-
ings over the latter’s objections. 
Congress is vested with broad authority to legislate—particularly 
under provisions like the Commerce, Spending, and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses of the Constitution.  Yet among these, only the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause provides anything resembling a credible justi-
fication here. 
† Partner at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, and author of WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS 
NOW:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTER-
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Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” both the specific legislative powers granted to Congress by 
the Constitution, as well as “all other Powers vested by th[e] Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States.”  Since the Constitution 
establishes a Supreme Court and empowers Congress to create other 
“inferior” courts, it has long been recognized that Congress, acting 
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, may enact laws regulat-
ing the federal courts.  With respect to the Supreme Court, for in-
stance, Congress has established by statute the number of Justices on 
the Court, what constitutes a quorum for the Court’s activities, and 
the opening date of the Court’s term.  Congress’s authority to create 
procedural rules governing the operations of the courts is particularly 
well-established and uncontroversial.  As the Court wrote in Burlington 
Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, “Article III of the Constitution, augmented 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . empowers Congress to estab-
lish a system of federal district and appellate courts and, impliedly, to 
establish procedural Rules governing litigation in these courts.” 
Of course, Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is not unlimited. The Court itself long ago appropriately re-
jected a rigid view of the Necessary and Proper Clause under which an 
act of Congress would have to be “absolutely necessary” to the exercise 
of an enumerated power for the action to be supported by the Clause.  
But the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower Congress to 
enact any law it fancies.  In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court explained 
when the Clause supports congressional action:  “Let the end be le-
gitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional.”  For the nearly two centuries since 
McCulloch, the Court has adhered to its view that the Clause authorizes 
only action “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to the pursuit of “le-
gitimate” ends. 
Legislation compelling the Court to televise its oral arguments 
does not pass muster under this standard.  Consider an effort to justify 
the Specter proposal on the grounds that it facilitates or advances the 
execution of the “judicial Power” created by the Constitution.  Such 
an argument would be difficult to sustain.  I have yet to hear a serious 
explanation that relates the bill’s purposes to anything having to do 
with the case before the Court in which the argument would be broadcast.  
No one even pretends that televising oral arguments would improve 
2007]   SUPREME COURT TV 54 
 
them, or the process of litigating a case before the Court, in any way, 
and the fact that Congress has enacted other rules regulating the activi-
ties of the Court tells us little about whether it may enact a bill like 
Senator Specter’s. 
Given the problems with defending this legislation on the basis 
that it is conducive to the administration of justice or otherwise ad-
vances the work of the judiciary, Professor Peabody understandably 
does not dwell on this ostensible justification.  He, like the members 
of Congress promoting the legislation, looks elsewhere. 
Leaving aside that some sponsors of the legislation sprinkle their 
rationale for the law with complaints about the outcomes of recent 
Court decisions, the more dispassionate explanations tend to invoke 
two goals:  (1) increasing public information and knowledge about 
the Court’s work, and (2) enhancing “accountability” of the Justices 
and scrutiny of their decisions.  Professor Peabody sounds a similar 
note, defending the law on the grounds that it would promote “Con-
gress’s oversight role or keep[] the citizenry informed about public 
affairs”—aims he believes Congress can pursue in accordance with its 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Professor Peabody cleverly analogizes these objectives to underly-
ing statutes like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), claiming 
that if we “don’t adopt this interpretation of the permissible applica-
tions of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress would seem to 
have almost no capacity to respond to a Court that sought to close its 
hearings entirely, keep its transcripts secret, or release them after a 
year . . . .”  This argument proves considerably too much. 
Even if Congress has the power (under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, or otherwise) to enact certain legislation providing the public 
with more information about government decisions and decision mak-
ing, or promoting government accountability, that does not mean all 
legislation motivated by those aims is authorized by the Constitution.  
Recall McCulloch v. Maryland:  Congress’s actions must be “appropri-
ate” and “plainly adapted” to the pursuit of “legitimate” ends. 
Assuming the legitimacy of the ends here, a law mandating the 
televising of the Court’s oral arguments is not “plainly adapted” to 
them.  In stark contrast to a law like FOIA, which gives the public ac-
cess to enormous amounts of otherwise unavailable material, televised 
oral arguments add little to the body of available information about 
the Court and its decisions.  Today, the Court routinely makes avail-
able oral argument transcripts the same day they are prepared, and 
also sometimes releases audio recordings to the public.  The marginal 
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increase in information accessible to the public by virtue of having 
video images from the Court’s arguments cannot reasonably be 
viewed as materially advancing Congress’s ability to conduct “over-
sight” of the Court during the proceedings, and certainly would have 
no impact on the ability of the public to learn about the Court’s deci-
sions, which are available for free on the Court’s website. 
At the same time, there are good reasons to view this proposed law 
as an attempt to impair the authority or independence of the Court.  
It is no secret that most of the current members of the Court oppose 
televising oral arguments, with Justice Souter famously declaring it 
would happen over his “dead body.”  Moreover, an examination of 
statements by the sponsors of Specter’s bill suggests that, for some at 
least, this initiative is animated by displeasure with the Court, and has 
a punitive dimension.  While the relevance of legislative motive in as-
sessing the constitutionality of a statute is legitimately subject to de-
bate, these statements make clear that separation of powers considera-
tions are implicated by an effort to force the Court to televise its oral 
arguments.  And when congressional action may jeopardize the au-
thority or independence of the executive or judiciary, claims of con-
gressional law-making authority should be subject to heightened scru-
tiny.  A law requiring the Court to televise its proceedings can only be 
supported by a reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause that seem-
ingly places no meaningful limits on Congress’s power, and lacks due 
regard for the separation of powers principles that infuse the Consti-
tution. 
CLOSING STATEMENT 
Bruce G. Peabody 
At the outset of his remarks, Mr. Gant concedes that Congress has 
broad authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, especially in 
creating “procedural rules governing the operations of the courts.”  
But he also notes that even these presumptively valid regulations must 
meet the test of constitutionality famously set out in McCulloch, a stan-
dard that requires Congress’s laws to target limited, “legitimate” ends 
through means “plainly adapted” to achieving those objectives. 
It is helpful to recall, however, that this legal construction is set 
out in a case often cited for recognizing the broad powers of govern-
ment.  McCulloch authorized Congress to create the Bank of the 
United States as an instrument implied by the great (but fairly sparse) 
governmental powers set out in the Constitution.  As Chief Justice 
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Marshall wrote in the opinion: 
[W]here [a] law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of 
the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire 
into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.  This 
court disclaims all pretensions to such a power. 
If televising the Supreme Court effectuates “any of the objects en-
trusted to the government,” the McCulloch precedent seems to bar the 
Court from examining the degree or amount of necessity for this pro-
posal.  Televising the Court can be valid even if its promised gifts are 
modest. 
But what is the legitimate constitutional end sought by the pro-
posed television bill?  Mr. Gant denies that the bill facilitates the judi-
cial power itself, but this conclusion is not obvious.  He is correct in 
arguing that the television measure would not assist the Court in re-
solving any of the specific cases it broadcasts, but this is a constrained 
view of what the Court’s judicial power entails. 
During its open sessions, the Supreme Court not only engages in 
oral argument, but Justices also read summaries of their decisions.  To 
take just one recent example, Justice Thomas read aloud a version of 
his dissent in the Court’s 2006 decision invalidating aspects of Presi-
dent Bush’s military tribunals program.  Reading these summaries is 
surely targeted at a broader audience than the parties to a case—
especially since there is no guarantee these individuals will even be in 
the courtroom.  But if it is a valid educational exercise of the judicial 
power to read these opinion summaries to the relative handful of 
people who can attend the Court in person, it would also seem legiti-
mate for Congress to promote these pronouncements by broadcasting 
them to the nation at large. 
Moreover, televising the Court is a valid way of advancing another 
aspect of the judicial power.  The Court’s supremacy, its status as the 
highest federal tribunal, implies its authority to foster legal clarity and 
stability throughout our judicial and political system.  This goal is re-
flected in, for example, the Court’s own rules governing review of cer-
tiorari petitions, which stipulate that it will be more likely to consider 
cases in which there are competing or inconsistent claims about fed-
eral law among courts (so that the Court can remedy this legal uncer-
tainty by providing a uniform legal interpretation for courts to fol-
low).  But the Court also attempts to advance this commitment to 
unity and stability in the law by addressing the broader public.  This 
can be seen, for example, in its efforts to achieve a unanimous deci-
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sion in Brown v. Board of Education (the Court apparently delayed issu-
ing the decision in order to achieve a 9-0 ruling even while the nation 
at large was deeply divided about the case), and in decisions like 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (in which Justice O’Connor spoke about 
the Court’s responsibility to the public to “remain steadfast” in up-
holding law and legal precedent). 
Given this aspect of the Court’s role, it is at least plausible to be-
lieve that televising the Court—and making its judicially authoritative 
voice available to millions of U.S. viewers—could support unity and 
steadiness in the law, at least among the citizenry. 
Finally, televising the Supreme Court may advance the judicial 
power in another, somewhat indirect way.  Some federal laws support 
the work of the Court by providing specific rules within a general area 
of governmental organization.  In these cases, while the particular 
rule is not itself strictly “necessary and proper” to advancing the work 
of the Court, establishing some specific regulatory guidelines certainly 
is essential.  For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1 establishes that the Court shall 
consist of “a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate jus-
tices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”  As the Court’s own 
history reveals, there’s nothing magical about a Court composed of 
nine members or a quorum of six—the Court has conducted its busi-
ness with fewer and more Justices.  But we need Congress to specify 
some number, so that we can fill its membership and the Court can 
conduct its business. 
The television bill can be seen in a similar light.  It should be rela-
tively uncontroversial to note that the Supreme Court needs rules 
governing how the public gains access to its building and proceedings.  
A law directing that open sessions of the Court be televised looks like 
a specific rule permissible under Congress’s broader power to regu-
late the public’s interface with the nation’s highest tribunal. 
Even if one sets aside these arguments regarding how the pro-
posed television legislation facilitates the judicial power, we might de-
fend the measure on other constitutional grounds.  Senator Specter’s 
bill has the capacity to deepen knowledge about government and help 
Congress and the populace scrutinize the work of the courts. 
Mr. Gant expresses doubts about the connection between the 
proposed legislation and these goals, indicating that televised Court 
proceedings will not add much to our substantive understanding of 
the high bench, since it already publishes its decisions (electronically 
and in traditional print form), and “routinely makes available oral ar-
gument transcripts the same day they are prepared, and also some-
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times releases audio recordings to the public.”  Insisting upon tele-
vised presentations, he contends, would simply require a different 
means of disseminating existing information, without providing any 
additional knowledge about the Court. 
But televising the Court could provide new insight that is not ob-
viously obtained through poring over electronic transcripts.  For ex-
ample, assuming it is valid for the public to examine whether Justices 
appointed for life are still able to conduct their work despite their of-
ten advanced age (and historically some sitting Justices have clearly 
failed this test), then it seems plausible that citizens could gain some-
thing distinctive by seeing live images of the Court. 
Moreover, it’s not clear why we should readily accept Mr. Gant’s 
implicit standard that congressional laws seeking to increase public 
knowledge under the Necessary and Proper Clause are limited to ex-
panding the kind of information currently available, as opposed to 
also extending the ways through which the public educates itself.  If, 
following the McCulloch standard, it is a “legitimate” constitutional end 
to disperse information and knowledge about government to the pub-
lic, the television measure seems “plainly adapted” to this end; it 
strains credulity to believe that improving and expanding the existing 
means of communication is unrelated to this goal of civic education.  
Congress’s 1996 passage of the E-FOIA amendments (providing the 
public with greater access to government documents and information 
via the Internet) seems premised on a similar view. 
In sum, requiring the Supreme Court to televise its open sessions 
is a defensible exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause given a va-
riety of legitimate objectives that would be advanced by this new regu-
lation.  The television bill would plausibly enhance governmental ac-
countability, not to mention the judicial power itself.  If McCulloch is 
the right test for construing the limits of Congress’s power, then the 
television bill passes comfortably. 
Mr. Gant concludes his analysis by suggesting that separation of 
powers principles may be implicated by the proposed legislation.  
“[W]hen congressional action may jeopardize the authority or inde-
pendence of the executive or judiciary,” he says, “claims of congres-
sional law-making authority should be subject to heightened scrutiny.” 
In the context of assessing the constitutionality of Specter’s televi-
sion proposal, it is not entirely clear how to apply this standard.  If 
Congress does not possess the authority to enact the bill, it cannot 
pass it.  The supremacy of the Constitution and the presumption that 
ours is a government of limited, enumerated powers do not seem to 
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allow for or require any “heightened scrutiny” on this front.  A law be-
yond the Constitution’s delegation of powers to Congress is null and 
void. As I have argued, the Specter measure does not fall into this 
category. 
But perhaps the proposed law would violate the authority of the 
judicial branch—to a degree that it threatens the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers.  Given the lengthy history of Congress’s regulation 
and superintendence of the Court and its procedures, one might 
imagine that the burden would be on opponents of the television bill 
to demonstrate how it imperils the judicial power.  The Specter bill, in 
regulating the means through which the Court publicizes and broad-
casts sessions it already makes public, represents a much less menac-
ing impingement on the Court’s autonomy than existing, widely ac-
cepted legislative practices, including Congress’s manipulation of the 
size of the Court, or its control of the Court’s budget. 
It will not do to insist that the television measure is somehow dif-
ferent because it is actively resisted by some Justices.  There is histori-
cal evidence that members of the Court opposed Congress’s adjust-
ment of its size following the Civil War, and Justices have long 
objected to Congress’s failure to provide them with pay increases.  But 
these complaints alone do not make Congress’s action (and inaction) 
unconstitutional in these cases. 
Mr. Gant is surely correct that some of the political impetus for 
the television proposal derives from “displeasure with the Court,” and 
may even have a “punitive dimension.”  But we do not require our law-
makers, or any of our politicians, to act in a political vacuum, uncon-
cerned about their own institutional prerogatives or how the behavior 
of the other branches might sap their power.  On the contrary, our 
political system seems premised on quite the opposite assumption:  as 
The Federalist No. 51 famously notes, our laws are formed from ambi-
tion counteracting ambition.  Through the “opposite and rival inter-
ests” of our competing institutions, we ensure that the “private inter-
est[s]” of our political leaders serve as “a sentinel over the public 
rights.” 
In the case of “Supreme Court TV,” the story can be told the fol-
lowing way:  Starting in the 1990s, the Supreme Court struck down 
federal laws at a rate not seen since the New Deal.  Congress stewed 
and eventually reacted, yielding proposals like Senator Specter’s.  But 
this result represents a productive harnessing of Congress’s irritation, 
and the resulting bill could provide real benefits to the public.  We 
should only hope that every instance of institutional conflict produced 
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such a valuable by-product. 
Mr. Gant admits that he “enjoy[s] watching Supreme Court oral 
arguments,” but only can attend them occasionally, despite working 
half an hour from the Court.  This characterization makes the pro-
posal to televise the Court sound more like a luxury than a vital tool in 
civic education and responsible governance.  But the new law would 
provide its greatest benefits to a class of people for whom television is 
their most consistent means of gathering news and to the millions of 
Americans who live outside the Beltway and may never have a chance 
to visit the Supreme Court in person.  The Court access that Mr. Gant 
clearly enjoys is not, as a practical matter, available to most ordinary 
citizens.  We should do what we can to redress this fact, instead of pre-
tending that the problem rests with the people themselves. 
One should not overestimate the potential effects of “Supreme 
Court TV.”  Televising the Supreme Court will not, on its own, in-
stantly create a public that is able to appreciate, say, the evolution of 
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, or the finer points of 
collateral estoppel.  But it’s also hard to see how giving people more 
access will itself produce public ignorance.  In a government that re-
mains committed to rule of, by, and for the people, we ought to put 
our thumb on the scales of openness and information, not exclusion 
and secrecy. 
CLOSING STATEMENT 
Scott E. Gant 
Having argued only half-heartedly in his opening statement that 
Congress is empowered to compel the televising of Supreme Court 
proceedings on the ground that it effectuates the “judicial power” 
enumerated in the Constitution, Professor Peabody dedicates a sig-
nificant part of his rebuttal to pressing this point.  I find none of the 
three arguments advanced in this cause persuasive. 
First, while conceding that televised proceedings would not facili-
tate the disposition of specific cases, he characterizes the practice of 
sometimes reading excerpts from opinions or summaries as an “edu-
cational exercise,” and leaps to the conclusion that because the Court 
undertakes this practice “it would also seem legitimate” for Congress 
to force the Court to televise the activity.  The connection between 
these points is elusive.  The Court might voluntarily undertake a vari-
ety of practices that Congress could not properly force upon it, and 
that do not themselves further or effectuate the judicial power. 
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Second, Professor Peabody claims that compelled televising of 
Court proceedings promotes the judicial power because “it is at least 
plausible” these video images would widely disseminate the Court’s 
“judicially authoritative voice” and “could” aid the Court in pursuing 
“unity and steadiness in the law.”  This argument, while imaginative, 
demonstrates how far one must stretch to come up with anything re-
sembling a plausible claim that the proposed legislation furthers the 
judicial power.  Even assuming the Constitution authorizes Congress 
to promote the idea that the Court speaks with a “judicially authorita-
tive voice”—whatever that means—it is unclear how televising the 
Court’s proceedings would advance that goal.  In fact, there are good 
reasons to think televised proceedings are as likely to undermine that 
goal as advance it, and Professor Peabody offers no explanation, let 
alone support, for his assertion. 
Next, he suggests forced televising furthers the judicial power be-
cause Congress has enacted other statutes that “support the work of 
the Court by providing specific rules within a general area of govern-
mental organization.”  His example is the law setting the number of 
Justices on the Court, and defining what constitutes a quorum.  Al-
though the precise contours of Professor Peabody’s argument are not 
entirely clear, his claim distorts the concept of the judicial power and 
the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause beyond recognition.  It 
is not at all apparent, for instance, that rules “governing how the pub-
lic gains access” to the Court have anything to do with effectuating the 
judicial power.  Even so, the fact that Congress might have power to 
enact some rules regarding public access does not mean it has the 
power to enact any rule it wants that is conceivably related to “public 
access.”  A statute setting the number of Justices and how many must 
be present to conduct business is “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” 
to effectuating the judicial power.  Forcing the Court to televise its 
proceedings, which Professor Peabody admits will do nothing to fur-
ther the administration of the Court’s own activities, is too attenuated 
to come within the ambit of that legitimate end. 
 Supplementing his effort to prove that the law furthers the ju-
dicial power, Professor Peabody returns to the argument from his 
opening statement that the proposed law would facilitate public over-
sight of the Court.  Although he mischaracterizes my argument by 
stating that I claim televised proceedings would fail to provide any ad-
ditional knowledge about the Court, Professor Peabody appears to be-
lieve that Congress is empowered to enact any statute so long as it 
provides some information to the public, on the basis that it promotes 
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“civic education.”  Again, this seems to stretch the Necessary and 
Proper Clause beyond recognition. 
Professor Peabody once more relies on the federal Freedom of In-
formation Act for support.  Of course, the fact that Congress enacted 
FOIA does not prove it had the power to do so (and I am unaware of 
any case adjudicating the issue).  Nevertheless, one need not question 
Congress’s authority when enacting FOIA to view skeptically Con-
gress’s power to mandate televised Court proceedings.  Despite hing-
ing his argument on the premise that televised proceedings will “dis-
perse information and knowledge about the government to the 
public,” Professor Peabody never specifies exactly what “information 
and knowledge” will be increased if proceedings are televised.  Is it 
whether Justice Scalia sits up straight or reclines when he hurls zingers 
at lawyers?  Whether Justice Breyer rests his hand on his forehead 
when he is thinking out loud?  If this were all, it surely would not be 
enough.  Yet Professor Peabody seems to believe Congress can force 
the Court to televise its proceedings provided there is any additional 
data made available to the public by doing so.  And, under his logic, 
compelled televising necessarily passes muster because video images 
convey information which cannot be discerned from audio or printed 
transcripts of proceedings. 
He defends his position by quoting a section from McCulloch, sug-
gesting the passage “seems to bar” an examination of necessity for the 
law, and concluding the law “can be valid even if its promised gifts are 
modest.”  Read in the context of the case as a whole, this passage 
hardly stands for the proposition suggested by Professor Peabody.  
Moreover, the quotation itself refers to a law “really calculated to effect 
any of the objects entrusted to the government” (emphasis added).  
What Professor Peabody and I have been debating is whether a law 
forcing the Court to televise its proceedings is “really calculated” to 
further any of the “objects entrusted to the government”—and figur-
ing that out requires an examination of those objects and the ostensi-
ble relationship of the law to them.  The particular passage from 
McCulloch that Professor Peabody relies on in his rebuttal does noth-
ing to further analysis of that issue. 
Finally, Professor Peabody may misunderstand my point about the 
relationship between separation of powers considerations and an as-
sessment of Congress’s power to enact the law in question.  Under the 
separation of powers doctrine, a law or action can be deemed uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Constitution’s 
allocation of responsibilities to, or among, the branches of the federal 
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government.  When there is, at best, questionable authority for legisla-
tive action, I believe more exacting scrutiny should be applied to that 
action if it impinges on the independence or authority of a coequal 
branch of government.  Such an approach is entirely consistent with a 
holistic reading of the Constitution, and arguably compelled by sepa-
ration of powers principles.  Professor Peabody dismisses my conten-
tion out of hand, and does not seriously grapple with the idea, instead 
observing that Congress could do worse to the Court, even while ac-
knowledging the impetus for the television mandate is displeasure 
with the Court’s rulings. 
Professor Peabody says we “should not overestimate” the potential 
benefits of televised court proceedings.  He seemingly already has, 
calling it a “vital tool in civic education and responsible governance.”  
Clearly, Professor Peabody and I have different perspectives about the 
virtues of televised Court proceedings.  But it appears that, under his 
analysis, Congress could force its will upon the Court even if televised 
proceedings fostered more confusion and misunderstanding than 
enlightenment, and even if they undermined the Court’s standing 
with the public.  Congress, he appears to believe, has free rein to de-
cide what will effectuate the powers enumerated in the Constitution. 
Congress undoubtedly has significant latitude when exercising its 
judgment about whether the Constitution empowers it to act.  It 
would be unwise, however, for Congress to precipitate a conflict with 
the Court by enacting Senator Specter’s bill, even if the legislature be-
lieves it has the authority to do so.  If Congress nonetheless presses on, 
the ostensible rationales for such a law seem too remotely related to 
the pursuit of any legitimate end, particularly given the risk that the 
law may impinge on the Court’s independence.  Admittedly, this is a 
close call, given the breadth of Congress’s constitutional powers.  Yet 
sometimes lines must be drawn and limits set.  In my view, if enacted, 
this legislation would be one of the rare examples when Congress has 
exceeded the bounds of its considerable Article I authority. 
